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The rapid growth of digital video distribution has 
highlighted new important issues in digital rights 
management, as well as in other important applications 
such as video authentication. Digital watermarking offers 
a promising solution against piracy and it is therefore a 
very active area of research. However, robustness to 
video manipulations, either malicious or not, is a 
demanding task because there are many different types of 
possible attacks that can be envisioned. Among these, 
geometric and temporal distortions play the major roles. 
The countermeasures against these specific attacks are 
still an open challenge. In this paper we propose the use 
of a video authentication template based on bubble 
random sampling. The authentication template is 
introduced in order to ensure temporal synchronization 
and to prevent content tampering. The simulation results 
are encouraging and this approach is therefore worth 




The recent innovations in the field of digital technology, 
in particular with the introduction of the Digital Versatile 
Disc (DVD), and the widespread diffusion of the Internet 
network, have made possible the large scale diffusion of 
digital video.  
However, although digital video offers high performance 
to the final user, content owners have been concerned 
with the problem of digital piracy caused by the 
simplicity with which digital data can be copied and 
distributed. Encryption offers only a first stage solution 
because, once decrypted, the data are not protected 
anymore.  
Video watermarking has been proposed as a 
complementary solution. Video watermarking consists of 
the embedding of some hidden copyright information, 
called watermark, inside the original data.  
The principal conflicting requirements for watermarking 
are capacity, which is the quantity of information 
associated to the watermark, imperceptibility, that 
requires the watermark to produce no visible artifacts in 
the original video, and robustness, that is the ability of the 
watermark to resist to attacks, intended as any possible 
video manipulation, malevolent or not. Real-time feature 
may be an addictional requirement. 
Video watermarking was initially employed to enforce 
copyright protection and to provide an effective copy 
control mechanism. It has also been proposed in other 
contexts. In fingerprinting, a watermarking system can be 
used to trace traitors transmitting copyrighted data across 
Internet via a peer-to-peer system. In active broadcast 
monitoring, digital watermarking could be used to embed 
some data to ensure the payment of royalties. It could also 
improve video coding techniques by replacing the channel 
coding step with the insertion of a watermark consisting 
of the error correcting codes. 
Image watermarking has been developed first, but 
nowadays many other fields have been explored, 
including text, audio, and video. The robustness of image 
watermarking is often studied applying transcoding 
between different formats, by adding some noise, or 
performing a geometric attack, such as, e.g., StirMark [1], 
that tries to break the consistence between the embedder 
and the detector coordinates. Virtually all types of image 
processing techniques have been used in still image 
watermarking, each one with a different grade of 
robustness against the possible attacks, and its own pros 
and cons. 
In case of digital video watermarking, new attacks may be 
envisioned. For example, we mention temporal 
desynchronizations, statistical attacks, including collusion 
and average attacks [2] that aim to estimate the hidden 
data using frames or watermark correlation properties, 
and video editing, either in the pixel domain or in the 
temporal domain. All types of denoising [3] should also 
be considered as statistical attacks. 
Early video watermarking techniques rely on still image 
watermarking results and inherit all their nice properties. 
However, video frames are not usual still images because 
they possess peculiar temporal correlation caused by 
motion, and simple extension of still image watermarking 
schemes to video is not advisable [4][5].  
Consequently, other approaches have been explored, 
including the combined use of  DCT and drift 
compensation to reduce visible artefacts [6], temporal 
wavelet decomposition [7], 3-D DFT [8] and local 
activity measures [9].  
To prevent geometric and/or temporal distorsions, video 
watermarking schemes might include proper templates, as 
proposed for example in [9], to invert these operations 





Figure 1. The process of bubble random sampling. 
 
In this paper we propose the use of a video authentication 
template based on bubble random sampling to recover the 
exact frame position within the original video. In this way 
it is possible to reverse eventually occurred temporal 
desynchronizations.  
The method is based on bubble random sampling, 
described in Section 2. The proposed authentication 
template is presented in Section 3, whereas experimental 
results are reported in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn 
in the final section. 
 
 
2. BUBBLE RANDOM SAMPLING 
 
Bubble random sampling of a still image consists of a 
random selection of circular (or square) areas of the 
considered image. This approach has been originally 
proposed for content-based retrieval, in which case these 
areas were used to generate a fingerprint of the considered 
image [12].  
In this paper, we use video bubbles that include also the 
temporal dimension. Every 3-D bubble consists of a 
sequence of 2-D bubbles, which are called intra-frame 
bubbles, or I-bubbles, of identical spatial position and 
belonging to adjacent frames. The size of the I-bubbles 
could be set or could be varied along the temporal 
dimension. The process of bubble random sampling is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. First of all, the radius and the spatial 
position of each bubble is randomly extracted, 
accordingly to a probability distribution function set a 
priori. Then, the temporal position of the bubble is 
determined by extracting, from a uniform probability 
distribution function, the position in time of the first 
frame of the bubble, and the number of consecutive 
associated frames.  
In general, the temporal length of the bubble should be 
enough to guarantee a significant histogram boundaries 
evaluation, as explained in the following section. 
Some of the parameters of this process can be modified 
by the user, namely: the number of bubbles to be 
considered, the probability distribution function of the 
radius/side of the bubbles, and the limits of the bubble 
temporal length. 
Figure 2 shows an example of an ellipsoidal  video 
bubble. Frames are depicted as rectangles; the lighter 
areas represent the I-bubbles. 
 
 
3. THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION 
TEMPLATE  
 
In this section we describe the application of bubble 
random sampling to the extraction of an effective video 
authentication template.  
Specifically, the video is first decoded, then the bubble 
random sampling is carried out. Finally a list of extracted 
features, which is called the video hash, is stored. The 
decoding process is necessary because the proposed 
technique is based on uncompressed video.  
Two different versions of the authentication template 
have been considered, both using some features based on 
the luminance histogram. Figure 3 depicts the processing 
steps involved in the video hash generation. The process 
of random bubble extraction needs the introduction of an 
additional user defined parameter. It is in fact necessary 
to specify how many bubbles are forced to include the 
first and the last frame, that have for statistical reason less 
probability of being extracted.  
 
 
Figure 2. Ellipsoidal video bubble example. 
  
 
Figure 3. Procedure for video hash generation. 
 
The luminance histogram is the feature selected for video 
frame authentication.  
The storing and matching of the complete histogram is 
too cumbersome, and therefore an histogram quantization 
is necessary.  
This operation has been already evaluated in the 
framework of content-based image retrieval [10]. In that 
application, the problem is to find the perceptually similar 
images, and so the quantization is aimed to match at best 
the human perception [11]. 
In our case, the template uses two very simple histogram 
quantizations laws, in order to keep a reduced overall 
complexity.  
In the first case, it consists in a uniform quantization of 
the 256 luminance levels into 16 bins; histogram 
matching is performed via standard L1 metric evaluation, 




In the second case, the histogram quantization is again a 
uniform quantization with 16 bins, but it considers only 
the luminance level portion (in multiplies of 16) of the 
histogram in which it is present at least the 90% of the 
total luminance values.  
The new histogram distance D’’ is computed as follows: 
 
 
where the factor αi is the semisum of adjacent bins 
histogram difference, except for the first and the last bins, 
for which it evaluates the successive and precedent bin 
difference respectively.  
The inclusion of this factor accounts for occasional 
spilling of luminance values into adjacent bins due to 
noise adding.  
The histogram distance D’’ is essentially a L1 metric in 
which every bin contributes to the sum in dependance of a 
factor that weights the adjacent bins differences.  
In Figure 3 the dashed line represents the first type 
template that doesn’t use any luminance histogram 
boundaries evaluation step. 
It should be noted that the occurence of value-metric 
distorsions, e.g. increasing the image luminosity, are 
likely to drastically modify the luminance histograms. If 
robustness to such attacks has to be granted, other 
approaches, already presented in the literature, need to be 
explored. 
In the synchronization phase, the proposed algorithm 
reads the original video hash, that could be sent along 
with the video in an encrypted form, and whose absence 
should prevent correct video reproduction, and compares 
it with that obtained by the processing of the received 
video.  
Luminance histograms are then computed in spatial 
coordinates; for every I-bubble, the frames that have 
scored the minimum distance values are identified.  
To decide the correct frame localization, a common 
output on all the I-bubbles pertaining to the same frame 
have to be detected; an exception is made for zero 
distance frames, that are likely to occur between 
contiguous frames.  
A text output file lists the frames recovered correctly, that 
is to say correctly authenticated. 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
The performance of the proposed authentication template 
were evaluated considering the sequences “Mobile and 
Calendar” and “Flowers garden”. Both of them last nearly 
10 seconds, and were MPEG-2 encoded with a frame rate 
of 40 frames per second, with a 4:2:0 pattern.  
The sequences were decoded, and the frames stored in 
YUV format. Several video hash generations were 
performed, with different overall number of bubbles and 
temporal bubble length. As expected, the template could 
easily recognize temporal video editing operations as 
frame dropping or frame shuffling. 
Then the frames were manipulated by adding a moderate 
Gaussian noise to simulate transmission errors. The first 
template, that uses uniform histogram quantization  and 
standard L1 metric, fails to recover the correct frame 
synchronization on about 15% of frames; this is mainly 
caused by the coarse quantization, especially in very 
dense histograms.  
The second, more sophisticated template decreases this 
error rate to about 6%.  
These values have been obtained considering 20 
experiments. As a final test, a central frame was edited by 
inserting a black zone covering the 10% of the total frame 
extension. If the number of bubbles were sufficient (more 
than 20 per frame), these manipulated frames were 
recognized as not original, 19 times out of 20. For the 
system to perform correctly it is in fact necessary that the 
zone tampered with to be covered by at least one bubble. 
Increasing the number of bubbles helps to decrease false 
positive occurrence, but increases also the computational 
cost. These results are described in Fig. 4. 
 
                    TEMPLATE NO. 
 
ATTACKS 
1 (D’) 2 (D’’) 
Single or Multiple Frame 
Dropping 1.00 1.00 
Frame Shuffling 1.00 1.00 
Gaussian Noise Addiction 0.85 0.94 
Single Frame Cropping 0.95 0.95 
 
Figure 4. Experimental successful temporal 




In this paper we have presented a bubble random 
sampling approach applied to the construction of a video 
authentication template used for synchronization and 
content verification in the context of video watermarking. 
More specifically, a suitable feature extraction is 
performed in randomly selected areas of the video, that 
are the union of adjacent frames square areas. The 
positions, side and temporal localization of these bubbles 
result from a random extraction, with user-defined 
parameters. The reliability and the effectiveness of this 
scheme have been proven through simulation on real data.  
Further efforts are to be addressed in this application to 
improve the feature extraction process, for instance 
including a time-stamping to helps the synchronization 
process, and a geometric template to make the system 
more robust with respect to geometric intra-frame 
distorsions. Moreover, the template itself should be 
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